Naive Realist Theory of Colour

Editeur: OUP Oxford Date de sortie: 2016-11-17

Description

A Naive Realist Theory of Colour defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment, that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide-spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours don't really exist - or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is arguedthat a nave realist theory of colour best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined either by reflecting on variations in colour perception between perceivers and across perceptual conditions, or by our modern scientific understanding of the world. A Nave RealistTheory of Colour also illustrates how our understanding of what colours are has far-reaching implications for wider questions about the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between mind and world, the problem of consciousness, the apparent tension between common sense and scientific representations of the world, and even the very nature and possibility of philosophical inquiry.

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Informations complémentaires

Genre: Philosophy of mind

Collection: OUP Oxford

Format: Adobe PDF

Pages: 224

ISBN: 9780191071645

Informations complémentaires

Genre: Philosophy of mind

Collection: OUP Oxford

Format: Adobe PDF

Pages: 224

ISBN: 9780191071645

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